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mands for treatment, and there is much that can and should be
done, to prevent psychiatric disturbance or diminish its effects.
Psychiatry is not at present orientated in this direction to any
extent, although there are several practical techniques avail-
able. Some of these are discussed.
The single most important factor would seem to be a correct
orientation, that is, to see the possibilities of prevention and to
have the zeal to exploit them. This involves planning and
action on a community basis and on the model of public
health.
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THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL-EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO PSYCHOTHERAPY
-A REVIEW
D. L. NORRIS, M.B., B.CH. (RAND), D.P.M. (RAND), Psychiatrisl, Tara Hospital, Johannesburg
Existential philosophy has been gaining ever stronger
support in the Western world over the last 20 years or so.
This is perhaps a reaction to the mechanistic, pragmatic
approach of modern science which, when applied dog-
matically to Map. himself, has only succeeded in dehuman-
izing him.
Existentialism is the sole philosophy which places man
in the centre of things-it is not the philosophy of a
transcendental deity or of a Super-state of which man is
merely a tool, nor is it the philosophy of a depersonalized
machine called Man.' Dealing, as it does, with Man him-
self, existentialism has rapidly influenced modern psychia-
tric thinking. Yet, if the philosophy makes sense and the
existential understanding of man is indeed a deep one, the
question must still be posed: how can we apply this
understanding in the everyday psychotherapeutic handling
of our patients? This paper deals only with those aspects
of existential-phenomenology which, I feel, have a practi-
cal value in psychiatry.
At the outset I must stress that existentialism is not a
school of psychotherapy-it proposes no technique. Rather
it is a way of understanding man so that any technique
we apply is meaningful in terms of the patient's reality.
Freda Fromm-Reichman once said that our patients need
an experience, not an explanation. To this the existen-
tialist would add: an experience which is meaningful to
the patient and acceptable to his mode of 'being-in-the-
world'. All :hat the existentialist would really say of tech-
nique and explanation is that these must follow under-
standing and not emerge from theory or prejudgement.
Existentialists use the phenomenological method in order
to penetrate or empathize with man's world of experience.
Phenomenology can be defined as an analytico-descriptive
study of the varying forms in which something appears
or is manifested, as opposed to the natural-scientific, syn-
thetico-constructive studies of causal origins, significances,
etc., which go beyond what is intuitively apparent. It is
the study of man's experience of things before all reflec-
tion as to how such experience is possible, or why it
comes about.
Phenomenology had its beginnings with Wilhelm Dilthey
who, in 1894, pointed out the difference between under-
standing and explaining."" Dilthey objected to the Wund-
tian psychology of the time. This was an explanatory
psychology which attempted, following the method of the
natural sciences, to construct. the total man from the
elements found on introspection (modern orthodox psy-
chology differs only in the elements which are now the
results of experimental observation, the methodology is
the same). Dilthey stressed that man always acts as a
unitary whole and that no amount of explaining from
elements will ever lead us to understand or empa!hize
with the total man. On the contrary the method of
psychology should begin with the whole man and be
analytic and descriptive.
Man can be viewed via the constructive method of the
natural sciences, but when we explain an organism we
can nowhere get to 'understand' the living man in his
world. Both methods are possible and both essential, but
the constructive method cannot be called a psychology of
man.
The question arises: how can we really understand the
other person when we cannot directly experience his
feelings, urges and perceptions? Jaspers' suggested that
the empathic state arises from -the experience of some
change within ourselves when we relate to another. We
then reflect upon this change, and by relating it to our
own past experience of such change can interpret it
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meaningfully ill terms of our own reality and effectively
describe what is therefore going on in the other individual.
As Jaspers explains it, empathy is little more than the old
Wundtian introspection on our own subjective feelings
about another. But Husserl," following Brentano, has
clearly shown that this 'subject-object' interpretation of
the empathic process is unreal. It is not a subjective intro-
spection nor can it be an objective observation; in point
of fact, the distinction between subject and object is not
as clear-cut as our scientific inheritance from Descartes
would make it. What characterizes all psychic phenomena
is that they exhibit 'intentionality'-they 'intend' them-
selves towards an object. In perception something is per-
ceived, in a judgement something is judged and in love
someone is loved.
There can be no experience without some object (real
or imagined) being experienced, no consciousness without
something of which to be conscious, and no behaviour
without some object towards which that behaviour is
directed. Thus the subject 'man' cannot be separated from
the object which he observes; any such separation of
subject and object is purely artificial. The purely objective
approach is based on an intentional artificial cleavage
between man and his world which nowhere exists in ex-
perience; such an approach observes only the organism
and not the man. On the other hand an empathic relation-
ship with a patient is a unitary relationship, the reality
exists solely in the relationship and not in me as a subject,
or my patient as an object. One does not have to intro-
spect, the experience of the relationship 'speaks for itself'.
We do not observe our patient in any cold dispassionate
way. We attempt to come into 'dialogue' with him in the
sense of the word as used by Buber.' Empathy is a primary
self-validating experience which is completely lost if
reflected upon in terms of any theory, preconception or
prejudgement; it is in fact the immediate pre-reflective
experience of man's relationship to fellow man.
Through this empathic understanding we can, step by
step, enter our patient's world of experience as it reveals
itself in space and time. But the phenomenological analy-
sis is not merely a static and therefore somewhat sterile
description. We can meaningfully link up the patient's
past and future as he experiences them here and now. We
experience a dynamic ongoing picture where one pheno-
menon clearly arises out of another without the necessity
for assuming any cause and effect theory. Later perhaps
we may apply our favourite theory; we may find that it
becomes more meaningful in terms of actual experienced
facts of the patient's world rather than the assumption of
unconscious forces or other dynamisms which can be
nothing more than unprovable explanations however use-
ful these assumptions might be.
Essentially in the first place, when attempting to arrive
at some sort of diagnosis, we shall be studying the form
of our patient's experiences and behaviour rather than
their content. It is more impor ant that we understand our
patient is suffering from a passivity experience or a pri-
mary delusion, rather than knowing the particular content
of his experience. Content however becomes vital, when
in therapy we wish to modify his experience, or wish to
find meaningful relationships with past experiences. Fre-
quently, however, we shall find experiences in our patients
with which we cannot truly empathize. These are pheno-
mena which appear to arise de novo and are totally alien
to our 'normal' experience and to the patient's personality
development. Such phenomena can then only be under-
stood, granted the primary assumption of a process dis-
order; a biochemical disturbance, a physical trauma or a
toxicity, etc.
For example, one can easily empathize with the gradual
emergence of a paranoid reaction occurring in response
to the stresses of late life, or the paranoia of the homo-
sexual or insecure adolescent. There are clear meaningful
connections with the total life situation of these patients.
But the paranoid delusions of the schizophrenic, arising
abruptly out of nowhere, are totally alien to normal ex-
perience. In their form they are alien, primary and irre-
ducible experiences which go beyond the relationship of
man to man. It is here that phenomenologists such as
Jaspers and his followers cross swords with the psycho-
analytic existential psychiatrists who seek to find psycho-
dynamic developments in the schizophrenic (and manic-
depressive) experiences. The psychoanalyst may well be
able to derive the content of a primary delusion or an
hallucination along dynamic or empathizable lines but
nowhere can he meaningfully derive their form. Why in
fact do they suffer from the experience of primary delu-
sion or hallucination? By what means does reality become
so distorted, whereas the non-psychotic schizoid individual
experiences reality in a different but 'normal' form? The
whole form of the schizophrenic's experience differs from
the normal and from his own pre-psychotic experience and
nowhere can this difference in form be derived empathic-
ally. In their attempts to arrive at the total picture pheno-
menologically, writers of the calibre of Binswanger:
Laing' and others are perhaps justifiably accused of being
somewhat imaginative. Laing's understanding of the pre-
psychotic 'schizoid cleavage' is intense, deep and meaning-
ful, but the breakdown into psychosis remains beyond
phenomenological understanding. It is thus that some of
the Continental psychiatrists prefer to talk of such en'ities
as an obsessional personality development and an obses-
sional reaction to stress which are amenable to psycho-
therapy, and an obsessional psychosis which, apart from
content being modified, fails to respond to psychotherapy.
Similarly the hysterical reactions can be so divided.
Pure phenomenology then gives us a deeper and more
realistic (and therefore more scientific) understanding of
our patients. Ii: provides us with the basic units from
which any theory of Man must be constructed; the
understanding which must precede exolanation. Through
phenomenology we can penetrate the fine distinctions be-
tween personality deveIopment and process disorder, be-
tween inauthentic man and diseased brain, and though
even the most deteriorated schizophrenic will benefit from
a feelingful psychotherapeutic approach which understands
the patient on his own terms and in his own world, we
shall be aware that we are not thereby tackling the initial
process disturbance but only the contents emerging
therefrom.
Existentialism-the phenomenology of Being itself-
had its formulated starting point in Kierkegaard's original
conception of truth: 'Truth exists only as the individual
himself produces it in action'."- The existentialists would
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portray man, not as an isolated subject living in his world
of reason (alld therefore inaccessible directly to us), nor
yet as a collection of substances and mechanisms, but
rather as one who happens to exist at a given moment in
time and in space (and hence has substance and mecha-
nism) and who is aware of that fact or should be aware
of it (and hence has reason), and who is confronted with
the problem of what to do about it." There are only two
'facts' of existence-two absolutes which make existence
real. The first is that here and now I am existing and,
second, that at some future date I will no longer exist.
Man is aware of both these facts-therein lies his unique-
ness-his crucial problem is what to do between these two
points. It is only Man's awareness of death which gives
existence and the problem of existing an absolute quality.
Without death, life would lose all meaning and form.
Phenomenologically, anxiety is the perception of immi-
nent non-being. Non-being is death in its ultimate, but in
its existential sense it is all that which negates full and
authentic being. It is denial of choice and responsibility,
surrender to dogma and conformism, escape from freedom
(Fromm) and restriction of the 'world-disclosing' nature
of existence.' Anxiety then, is the experience of the threat
to being as authentic (which presupposes an awareness of
authentic Being); or as Jaspers puts it, it is the condition
of the individual when confronted with the issue of fulfill-
ing his potentialities and choosing from the endless am-
biguity of alternative possibilities: It is thus not a quality
of existence; it is ontological-inherent in all Being. Man
must always face and accept the existential despair if
existence is to be authentic-the authentic existence, is
that man who is identical with himself in all his potentiali-
ties. The 'sick' man is one who attempts to evade this
existential despair. He may substitute the threat of non-
being for non-being itself. He surrenders himself to 'pre-
cast essence', denies his potentialities and escapes from
freedom into a 'controlled automatism', or man may
choose so to restrict his world-disclosure, as to experience
reality within an artificial framework of a narrow forma-
lized self-world; an alienation from or non-participation
in being-in-the-world.'
A third way of avoiding the existential anxiety is by,
so to speak, concretising it in the form of neurotic
anxiety-fear of things or situations. As I see it there is
a fourth way where we attempt to create non-being in
others, in order to lessen the burden of our own potential
non-being; anxiety thus becomes distorted into hate,
aggression, jealousy or lust.
Psychotherapy then is waged on the battleground of
choice, freedom and responsibility versus fear of non-
being in all its forms; a battleground which therapist and
patient must enter together. Every phenomenon of the
patient's experiences must be discussed and worked
through in its real, present and existential meaning. The
patient must know what he is experiencing before he can
understand why he is experiencing it. To allow of the
experience as an authentic reality it must not be restricted
by the imposition of prejudgement, preconception or
theoretically determined cause and effect. And the therapist
does not delve into the past as if seeking to uncover dirty
linen. Rather, as the present and the future become more
freely disclosed, so the past will be admitted unrestrictedly.
Psychological dynamisms such as repression take their
meaning from the in1mediate existential position, they are
not psychic-determining forces which must be broken
down." Existential therapy is a therapy of past, present and
future, as and if these 'qualities' of time are disclosed in
the patient's immediate experience.
Phenomenologically experienced time has absolutely
nothing to do with clock time-the only time which objec-
tive psychology can make explicit. The experience of the
'on-goililgness' of existence and the unity of past, present
and future exists before all 'closer observation' thereupon.
In fact as soon as we reflect upon it in a detached objective
manner the experience is lost and we are left with a de-
personalized clock time. It is the pre-reflective experience
of time which is responsible for our sense of continuity
and 'on-goingness' and not any measurable aspect of time.
The present is a quantum of duration embracing both
past and future as they are being experienced now. The
past is that which we have left behind but which still has a
living reality for us-what we have forgotten can in no
way be part of our experience of 'past'. We do not distort
or express the past in the mechanistic way suggested by the
orthodox psychoanalysts. Rather we experience it in a
way meaningful to our present needs and perceptions and
the only reality of the past is in that experience. The phe-
nomenologist goes further; the past always comes to meet
us from the future! This apparently paradoxical statement
becomes clear when we consider that what we are about
to do in the future largely determines which aspect of our
past experience now becomes relevant. The future is that
which is to come but only as it is coming now. Again, in
other words, the only real future is that which we are ex-
periencing now. Let us give a simple example taken from
Van den Berg: as phenomenologists always turn to living
examples rather than theory. If I am about to jump a
ditch, my present will embrace the future being-over-the-
ditch. I experience more or less the result of my jumping
before I have actually jumped. In a sense my future is
coming to meet myself. If this were not so, everything we
are about to do would be new and unknown to us. But the
future being-over-the-ditch brings to me my past experi-
ence of jumping, so that I can better gauge the force of
my jump--the past has come to meet me from my future.
It is on this understanding of past and future that the
existential therapist will investigate the patient's future
rather than his past, but the future as the patient experi-
ences it now and never as the therapist would impose it.
Always he will allow the patient to choose his own path-
way into the future and to accept his own responsibility
for that choice. Therapy attempts to attain a decisive 'com-
mi~ment' by the patient. It is not a planned procedure, not
a gradual unfolding, but rather the immediate grasping of
the critical moments of 'despair' when the patient can be
gently guided into awareness of his experiences. How often
have we struggled endlessly with a patient apparently get-
ting nowhere when suddenly in a moment of despair the
patient gains what we are pleased to call insight, and from
then on all goes well. Ask any 'cured' alcoholic and he
will tell you of this commitment experience, when one day
in the pits of deepest depression he suddenly became aware
of himself and thereafter remained 'dry', This commitment
in therapy is a kind of encounter when two beings sudden-
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ly come into perfect understanding.
Man exists not only in time but also in space. And here
again it is not the measurable space of yards and inches
which counts; a loved one can be a thousand miles away
and yet be ever near. The dimensions of experienced space
are those of estrangement or complete being-with, of the
emptiness of space or of space crowding in on one and
of the pervasion of the self into all space, or the impene-
trable isolation of the self in space. As time is the experi-
ence of the 'on-goingness' of existence, so space is the
experience of the momentary 'position' of existence.
Total self-awareness is the temporal and spatial experi-
ence of the 'I' as distinct from, but within, the world.
Jaspers' analyses self-awareness as (a) the feeling of acti-
vity-it is I who is doing this, (b) the awareness of unity-
I am aware at any given moment that I am one, (c) the
awareness of identity-I am aware of the continuity of my
past, present and future-and (d) the awareness of distinct
ego boundaries which delinea:e me from my world (but
which do not separate me from my world).
Only through the phenomenological meaning of
spatiahty and temporality can such morbid experiences as
depersonalization and derealization become understand-
able. For these phenomena are not illusions or hal1ucina-
tions in which measurable time or space become distorted
or fabricated. Patients say: 'I know I am real, I can see
that, but I don't experience it'; or 'Those trees are just
two yards away yet to me they seem so far away!'.
One other aspect of existential thinking needs clarifying
if we are to grasp ful1y the existential approach to therapy,
namely the concept of 'world', for existence is always a
being-in-the-world. We cannot understand 'world' by de-
scribing the environment no matter how accurate or de-
tailed that description. Nor can a person's world be in any
way measured. Our primary experience of 'world' is the
immediate signification of what we perceive. It is only on
reflection or closer inspection that we can artificially de-
tach ourselves from our world and observe the cold sen-
sory data; but that is not the way we experience 'world' in
everyday living and surely psychology must study man as
he lives, and not an artificial abstraction of man! Mey'
defines world as 'the structure of meaningful relationships
in which a person exists and in the design of which he
participates'. Man's world transcends the given space and
time not in any mystical way, but in a way real and vital
to experience. It is in this spatial and temporal transcend-
ing that our world differs from that of the animal; insofar
as we are able to infer the world of the animal. And it is
in this transcending that the roots of mental illness lie.
Hence the serious limitations of animal experimentation
as a lead to our understanding of man.
Binswanger: following the philosopher Heidegger; has
made explicit an almost commonplace observation, namely
that we experience 'world' in three distinct modes. Firstly
there is what is called the Umwelt or world-around. This is
the physical world of determining forces into which we are
thrown and to which we must adjust; the world with
which natural science concerns itself but not the only
world man experiences. The existentialist would say of the
Umwelt that predetermining forces are not entirely re-
sponsible for mental ill-health; there is always the man
who 'chooses' to al10w these forces so to act. While the
world-around limits our potentialities it does not neces-
sarily impose their fulfilment.
The Eigenwelt or own-world is the world in which we
experience the 'for-me-ness' of things. It is perhaps a broad
extension of Jaspers' self-awareness into the totality of
existence. It is in this world that we can talk of man's
choice, freedom and responsibility and of the existential
despair. It is to this world ultimately that psychotherapy
must appeal.
Final1y we have the MirwelE or with-world. This is the
world of relationships With fellow-beings, the primary ex-
perience of 'being-with' and of commitment to others. The
reality of MitwelE is not in 'me' or in 'you' but in the
'I-you' relationship and the essence of the relationship is
that in the encounter between two people both are
changed. Thus Buber' sees the to,al man as the develop-
ment of the 'I-thou', and Sullivan's interpersonal theory
says very much the same thing but along non-phenomeno-
logical, mechanistic lines. lo
The therapeutic relationship itself is of course a Mirwelr
experience, but through it all three modes of world-dis-
closure are understood and modified. It is common experi-
ence that a loved one brings the world closer to oneself
and makes it more real, more alive. And in the embrace
one becomes 'identical' with one's body. Friendship unites
me, my body and my world. When, on the other hand,
we are alienated from or fear another, we experience our
body and world too, as alien.' Disturbed contact formation
wi.h another, an alien Mirwelr, disturbs Eigenwelr and
Umwell. We become in fact to a degree depersonalized
and derealized.
Therapy attempts to reverse this disturbed contact for-
mation through the intense new experience of the thera-
peutic encounter. It matters little whether we subsequently
explain this in terms of reciprocal inhibition of condi-
tioned responses or the resolution of interpersonal con-
flicts. What matters is that our approach has been
meaningful in terms of our patient's reality and commit-
ment. Only then will he truly recover and allow his
existence to disclose 'world' in all its widest aspects.
SUMMARY
The history of the phenomenological movement in psychiatry
IS briefly discussed, with particular reference to Dillhey, Jas-
pers an~ Russer!. Phenomenology is defined as an analytico-
descnptlve study of the varying forms in which something
appears or is manifested.
The. empathi,: relationship is described as the immediate pre-
refl.ectlve expenence of man's relationship to his fellow man;
It. IS an att~mpt to enter the p<l;tient's world of experience
Without prejudgement or theorellcal preconception. To this
end, phenomenology studies the form of experience rather
than its content.
The existential view of anxiety as the perception of the
threat of imminent 'non-being' is seen as the basis for the
phenomenology of the neurotic's 'world', which becomes con-
stricted to avoid this existential despair so that choice and
responsibility are denied.
The phenomenology of time and space are discussed and
through these, an understanding of existence as 'beino-in-the-
world'. Man exists in the world in three modes; man bin rela-
tion to the physical, deterministic world; man in relation to
himself and h.is choice. and his freedom and responsibility; and
man III relatlOn to hiS fellow man and his commitment to
others.
The therapeutic encounter must provide an intense new ex-
perience in which the patient can freely commit himself to
wider 'world-disclosure'.
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WHAT TYPE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY?
Eysenck's major theme is to question the value of types
of psychotherapy other than that of behaviour therapy.
It may be noted that other authors using conditioning
methods have failed to attain the success of Wolpe, re-
lapses having occurred."
McConaghyH considers that the success of conditioning
therapy is in many cases due to the fact that the neurotic
conflict may have resolved, or the trauma may have
passed; the symptoms having persisted as an isolated
habit.
In essence, the difference between analytic-type therapy
and Wolpe's conditioning therapy consists of stress in the
former on the total emotional background (including rela-
tionships with key figures in the formative years of child-
hood) with which the current traumatic situation is inter:
acting, whereas behaviour therapists stress the single trau-
matic incident, on the matrix of heredity as the major
causative factor.
A recent study by Forrest" is an example of work
showing the importance of childhood in the development
of neuroses. A far greater incidence of childhood bereave-
ment was noted in patients with reactive (non-hereditary)
depress!on, than in normals and those with endogenous
depreSSIOn. There was no difference, however, between
these 3 groups as far as bereavement during adult life was
concerned.
Allport16 writes: 'A psychiatrist believer in conditioned
reflex the~apy tells of treating a woman for alcoholism by
the association of a glass of whiskey and an emetic. Un-
fortunately this therapy was her undoing for whenever a
salesman ~r a visitor came to the door smelling (as many
o~ ,them dl~) of alcohol, she straightway threw up on her
VISitors. It illustrates a cure not set in the context of total
life.'
The question. of the similarity of the results of psycho-
therapy of varIOus types is interesting. Frank" considers
2 factors of importance:
DIP. PSYCHJAT. (MCGILL), Psychiatrist, Johannesburg
end of the 5-year period. Denber writes that the findings
in this study indicate the value of a sympathetic attitude
toward the patient's problem, the allotment of sufficient
time, confidence toward the physician, coupled wi:h
commo?se~se advice and honest reassurance in discussing
the patlent·s conflIcts.
Eysenck is thus classifying general practitioner psycho-
therapy as of no consequence; ascribing to such cases a
'spontaneous remission'.
Furthermore, the patients in series from psychiatric
practice are usually those patients resistant or non-
responsive to supportive psychotherapy, as these patients
are referred on for specialist opinion.
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE RESULTS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY*
D. VORSTER, M.B., CH.B. (CAPE TOWN), D.P.M. (ENG.),
The importance of psychotherapy is stressed by Slater,]
who states that psychiatry itself would have no strong
claim to special status outside of internal medicine with-
out psychotherapy, which he defines as a planned endea-
vour to modify mental disorder by psychological methods.
IS PSYCHOTHERAPY OF VALUE?
In recent years, numerous articles have appeared attempt-
ing to gainsay the value of psychotherapy in the treatment
of the neuroses. Eysenck,'"O a protagonist of this group,
maintains that the incidence ot spontaneous recovery in
the neuroses is as great or greater than the percentage
recovery claimed by psychotherapists using psychoanalytic
and other (excluding behaviouristic/ conditioning) tech-
niques. His claim regarding the incidence of spontaneous
recovery is, however, based on controversial evidence.
Eysenck's criticism has stimulated further investigation
into the value of psychotherapy; the paucity of which is
stressed by Stevenson.' Eysenck adds that Wolpe's be-
haviour therapy based on direct symptom attack, is the
sole therapy achieving an 80 - 90% improvement result.'
Results of eclectic and analytic psychotherapy have varied
from 60 to 82%.'
More recently, the American Psychoanalytic Society has
disclosed results of an admittedly incomplete study on
patients completing an analysis, A 97% improvement rate
was given.' Of 595 patients, 306 were reported as com-
pletely analysed. Of the remaining patients who did not
complete an analysis, 50% discontinued treatment because
they had improved and the remaining 50'}o for other
reasons.
Ernst has published an extensive follow-up of 126
neurotics treated by psychotherapy after 20 - 34 years,
showing the results obtained." Similarly, a study by
Cappon ll indicates the value of analytic-type psycho-
therapy, by illustrating the relatively short period of
psychotherapy required for marked improvement in rela-
tion to the duration of symptoms.
How is one to explain the high incidence of 'sponta-
neous' recoveries mentioned by Eysenck? Often mental
disorder is modified by unplanned methods of psycho-
therapy. The 'commonsense' suggestions of friends, rela-
tives, books, and spiritual help from ministers of religion
are all of value. The passage of time and the removal of
the traumatic situation often result in improvement.
Eysenck uses as his basic argument regarding spontaneous
remission rates, a 5-year follow-up study by Denber,12 on
500 patients who received disability claims of 3 months
or longer for neurosis. These patients were not referred to
psychiatric specialists. Within 1 year of onset, 44% had
returned to work; only 10% appeared unemployed at the
'Paper presented at the 45th South African Medical Congress (M.A.S.A.),
Port Elizabeth, July 1965.
